IN this chapter we review the Endowment-Contrast (E-C) framework for assessing wellbeing (Tversky & Griffin, 1991), examine extensions and applications, and apply it to new empirical approaches to well-being research. The E-C model is a set of tools to use in thinking about-and measuring-happiness and well-being. The framework fits firmly in the "social constructionist" perspective on well-being, focusing as it does on the cognitive aggregation of hedonic impact over time and the distinction between objective circumstances and subjective value. We first review the historical context in which the framework was developed, describe the fundamental building blocks of the theory, and illustrate selected developments and applications. We then describe the generalization of the original framework and its application to the choice-judgment discrepancy, and dose with a discussion of the relevance of the framework to new distinctions in the measurement of well-being.
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THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT: HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY IN THE 1980S
The development of the E-C framework was motivated primarily by a reaction against some of the prevailing ideas of the time. One influential idea was the notion, associated with the work of Parducci (1984) on range-frequency theory, that intense pleasures should be restricted or avoided to prevent a contrast effect such that small daily pleasures become experienced as neutral or even disappointing. In the Parduccian view, intense but rare pleasures provide full value in the experience and do not chip away at the value of small pleasures. Thus, a fabulous honeymoon trip might add to life satisfaction because of the one-time pleasure without serving as a daily standard of comparison that reduces the pleasure of neighborhood walks with one's spouse. However, a regular round of cruises and luxury vacations might become both dull and leave daily life feeling especially flat. A second widely shared viewpoint was that the deliberate pursuit of happiness is doomed to failure because of the "hedonic treadmill" (Brickman & Campbell, 1971) caused by changing adaptation levels (Helson, 1964) . Why strive for a life of peak pleasures when lottery winners seemed to revert back to average levels of satisfaction and citizens of rich nations seemed hardly happier than those of poor nations? Related to this was the everyday observation that the same economic or social stimulus that led to despair in one person left another person's well-being untouched. How could a prescriptive approach to maximizing well-being have any currency given the observed variability in response to bad and good life events?
A third contributor to the zeitgeist of well-being research in the late 198os and 1990s was the frustration with the uncertain epistemological status of verbal reports of wellbeing, happiness, and life satisfaction. What if the lottery winner was truly but used different language-language responsive to adaptation effects-to express those feelings? Perhaps neuroscience would come to the rescue and provide a gold standard measure of true happiness; or perhaps asking people for willingness to pay for different states of life or health would overcome such a deep and apparently unsolvable problem.
A fourth important element of this intellectual period was that happiness and were entering the mainstream of social science, in the sense that researchers from public policy, law, health, and economics were all joining psychologists and sociologists in searchfor what made people less miserable, and in some cases, for what made people happy. Even at that time, a minority of economists (in particular, Easterlin, 1974) were sufficiently convinced by survey evidence on self-reported well-being to propose relativistic theories adapted from psychology that focused on adaptation and satisfaction. However, mainstream economics brought with it two fundamental canons of belief: more money was preferable to less money (in happiness, health, and marital partners), and the proper measure of utility was choice. Who knew what people meant by reports of happiness, or wellbeing? Who knew if people had the to reflect on what was good for them? What mattered was action, behavior, and observed commitment to one state of the world over another.
The E-C model was developed as a to these prevailing but its own brand of constructionism was also powerfully shaped by three more immediate methodological influences. The first of these was Amos Tversky's trademark use of simple formal models to turn a and messy problem into a sharp, testable We this further through detailed examination later in this chapter.
A second immediate influence was the work Kahneman, Slovic, and others on models 1990; Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988 ; explained the causes and of preference reversals, where people would choose A over B, but be to pay more money for B than A. 1hese were models of UUj;H;'-;H and choice because the specific information that the decision-maker noticed and used was contingent or conditional on the method of elicitation of rating or pricing or choice or elimination of alternatives). In particular, different methods of elicitation focused the decision-maker on different aspects of the options under '-V,,iM or on different ways to justify choice, or made different aspects of the options easier to compute and therefore weighted more heavily in the revealed preference. A tllird major influence that shaped the E-C model was the contemporary work of Fritz Strack and Nobert Schwarz on experiential versus cognitive effects on reported well-being, which was to some extent a social psychological analogue to the contingent judgment perspective. This line of work demonstrated that seemingly trivial manipulations such as spending time in an unpleasant room, or even answering a question about the frequency of recent dating experiences, could change the frame of reference by which life satisfaction was judged. Like models of contingent judgments, tlle work by Strack, Schwarz, and colleagues implied that answers to well-being questions in survey format were inextricably constructionist in tllat answers were sensitive to the way that target and surrounding questions were asked, the moods they aroused, and the memories they brought to mind (e.g., Strack, Schwarz, & Gschneidinger, 1985) . In other words, there seemed to be no single right answer to the question of how happy a person was: their true happiness-as measured by their response to a specific question at a specific time-"truly" did depend on the accessibility of memories and emotions, and the integration and interpretation of those accessible building blocks.
ENDOWMENT AND CONTRAST:
A PERSONAL HISTORY The fundamental insight underlying the endowment and contrast model emerged after many hours of talking about happiness and satisfaction; in particular about whether peak experiences today necessarily led to reduced pleasure in the future. What of that great dinner in New York at a conference? What of reading a fantastic book or seeing a great movie? What of a honeymoon trip to southern Spain? The insight, presented on Tversky's small whiteboard in his office, was simply represented as Sat 2 = E 2 + E, -C,. Satisfaction at the time of Event 2 (a French dinner in one's home town) is a function of the (positive) Endowment yielded by the second dinner plus the Endowment yielded (through memory) of the positive experience of the first dinner minus the contrast effect capturing the (negative) discrepancy between the French dining experience in New York and the local French dinner. Over time, the insight would have been represented as (1) to emphasize that all events are weighted contributors to well-being and that the key shifts in weights are those between We and We, the relative impact of the first dinner's endowment and contrast effects. Then, for some weeks afterward, Tversky would bring up real-life examples and see how well the simple representation held up-what of the aging professor whose greatest lifetime contribution was his dissertation, or the young comedian whose greatest exposure was as a break-through act on late-night television? Did their experiences fit? And what about the stories from Stouffer's sociological classic The American Soldier, where African-American soldiers stationed in the south of the USA were simultaneously poorer, less free, and more satisfied than African-American soldiers stationed in the north (Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star, & Williams, 1949) ? And while the academic literature from Easterlin to Parducci to Schwarz would the content of the it was the test of the anecdote that determined whether the model would survive on the whiteboard or suffer erasure.
The blocks of the model are and the role of memory as carriers of across time. and Griffin asserted that without memory, the of life satisfaction or overall would not exist.
to the who could not decide how on wellcondition the E-C model is about the dual direct and indirect effects from the evaluation of the event, not from the event. This distinction was to 0 "'"''"''t" the model from the "mood as information" model of Strack and which assimilation effects, The distinction is also model that tend to merge it with an as the carrier of contrast and "'"""'T·:nn as we look at the extensions to the E-C v"'o~~J'"~ model.
As and Griffin noted:
in both on the nature of the evaluated and on the standard of evaluation . . . authors have observed that satisfaction is related to the of the or its endowment, and related to the evaluation standard, which serves as a contrast \'\'hat is less obvious is the observation that the same event makes a dual contribution & Griffin, 1991, p. every ment varies with features of the event the of the contrast varies with features of the '·'"'"u'J"''" the or relevance of the will contribute to future cues that make a ""'"~'>''"'·c'~'"' of the contrast effect could be a event more or less relevant to model on the whiteboard was thus:
Here r 12 indicates the relatedness of the two events, and the whereas and cur-
hedonic between the two events where the hedonic value refers to the evaluation stored in memory, not to the actual oftheevent This model raises the important question of whether individual differences in happiness are at least partly determined by these weights: happy individuals may have the predisposition to look to the past for happy events that reflect endowment and unhappy events that generate contrast, and happy people may be able to convince themselves that contrasting negative events are more relevant as standards of comparison than contrasting positive events. This key question was raised in the statement of the original model, but as we shall see, it has only recently been addressed.
APPLYING THE ENDOWMENT-CONTRAST

DECOMPOSITION
Tversky and Griffin provided two "definitional" empirical studies to demonstrate the simultaneous operation of endowment and contrast effects. The two studies examined the effects of the past on the present by holding constant the value of present effects, and varying the relevance or similarity of the past to the current event. We provide here a more detailed account of the logic of the identification of endowment and contrast effects in an empirical design than was presented in the original chapter, and we present a revised symbolic vocabulary in the hope of simplifying the presentation. In the scenario study, participants first read a positive or negative story set in the past (1 week ago) from one of four domains (dating, academic achievement, social interaction, or movie-going) and then read a neutral story set in the present about the same or a different domain. This combination yields a 2 x 2 crossed design (positive/negative past story that is related/unrelated to current neutral story) fully within-subject. For each pair of past/present stories, participants rated the protagonist's level of happiness with life overall. The results of this study are presented in Fig. 4 .1 in the form of a bar graph with the neg ative past event conditions presented first, broken down by unrelated and related past events. The E-C model predicts a significant interaction between positivity of the past event and relatedness between the two events, because the endowment effects (positive versus negative across the two conditions) are the only effects operating in the unrelated past conditions but are opposed by countervailing contrast effects in the related past conditions. Both the graph and the 2 x 2 analysis of variance analysis confirm this. However, the total endowment and contrast effects can also be derived from the individual cell-level comparisons,' under the assumption that for the time 2 neutral event E 2 = o and thus can be ignored, that for unrelated events r 12 = o and hence C 12 = o for unrelated events, and that the salience of the the same the cell mean for the consists of the overall mean a endowment effect = 4.9-6.1 = -1.2. The overall endowment effect from the the sum of these absolute or 2.2. The isolation of the contrast effects is somewhat the fact that the two related conditions involve the forces of endowment and contrast. c + However, if we take the difference between the positive related and positive unrelated conditions, we see that the positive endowment effect cancels out, isolating the negative effect of contrast. Thus, the negative contrast effect associated with a past positive event is simply 6.8 -7.1 = -0.3; a reduction of 0.3 scale points of satisfaction. Taking the difference between the negative related and negative unrelated conditions, the negative endowment effect cancels out, isolating the positive effect of contrast: the positive contrast effect associated with a past negative event is simply 5.5 4·9 = o.6. The sum of these absolute values is 0.9, indicating that the total contrast effect was somewhat less than half the size of the total endowment effect, not surprising given the high salience of the past stories.
The second study illustrating the E-C decomposition used actual money as a reward, which provides a standard scale on which we can compare the relative power of positive and negative contrast effects. In this study, participants rated their satisfaction with the experience of playing two investment games, different types of computer-controlled stock markets. Like the first study, the two games played in sequence could be similar or dissimilar.
The games were manipulated so that all participants won a payoff of $4 in the second game, but either $2 or $6 in the first game. Thus, in a conceptually equivalent design to the first study, after completing the second game, participants could look back to the past at either a better or worse experience that was more or less related. However, in this case participants took part in only one cell of the design. As in the scenario study, the E-C model predicts a greater difference in satisfaction between the large and small past payoff conditions when the games are unrelated, because those participants will experience relatively pure negative and positive endowment effects. However, for those experiencing related games, the past also has a contrasting effect on current satisfaction. The same set of contrast weights can be used as presented earlier for study 1, but note the stronger assumption here: the relatedness coefficient r 12 is again assumed to be o when the games are different-this allows the same decomposition -but whereas stories of dating and schooling success are dearly unrelated, it is less clear that the results of two different investment games would be seen as completely unrelated. This simplifying assumption, when it does not hold, will understate the magnitude of the endowment effect, as we shall see shortly.
As can be seen in Fig. 4 .2, there is a substantial difference in satisfaction between the small and large unrelated past reward conditions, whereas participants in the two related conditions are almost equally satisfied, implying that the contrast effects almost perfectly offset the endowments. As the second payoff of $4 is constant across all4 cells, it is "absorbed" into the grand mean of 7·5· Again, assuming that the less similar experiences were completely unrelated, the difference between the positive unrelated mean and the grand mean reflects the positive endowment (8.7-7.5 = 1.2), and the comparable deviation from the negative unrelated mean reflects the negative endowment ( 6-4 7.5 = -1.1); the total endowment from the prior payoff is thus 2.3. Again, subtracting the positive unrelated mean from the positive related mean isolates the negative contrast effect (7-5-8-7 = -1.2), and subtracting the negative unrelated mean from tlle negative related mean isolates the positive contrast effect from a negative experience (7.3 6.4 = 0.9). Consistent with the key tenet of loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) , that losses from a reference point loom larger than gains, the negative contrast is larger than the positive contrast. The total contrast, 2.1, is almost equal to the total endowment, as implied by the shape of the bar graph.
These two studies clarify how the cognitive or symbolic nature of the E-C processes differ from more perceptual models of adaptation effects, such as hedonic treadmill (Brickman & Small ($2) Large ($6) Prior event FIG. 4.2 Effect of prior game on current satisfaction. Lamp,beJll, 1971) or range-frequency in the E-C framework is the hedonic value of events: events contribute to or satisfaction <in·•wthr and inversely depending on the closeness and salience of the relation between the and background events. The key in the adaptation models is the of the hedonic scale of experience or measurement: with the the becomes mundane. The adaptation of winners and n:c~re~rl!Pgics is sometimes described as a contrast such that the accident victim comes to value his or her powers and all the more due to lowered ("It could be while the lottery winner finds his or her ex1Jec:tatwr1s dashed should be 1ATnnnPrTl test between contrast and is diminished or enhanced because it is made in to a reference state or event \ ccmtras:t) or whether the hedonic itself is more or less nn,nnrP driven process is and detailed discussion of the nature of aa:aptan<on, so endowment effects in these nhPnnn>Pr'" known as assimilation m1:erpn~tatwn of a new stimulus ~"'''-'H"'"' so that the new stimulus is perex1Pe<:tatwn or belief more than it does. vv''""Jn .. , as when a neutral stimulus appears to be of a members of that surround it. The endowment event or information is not used to the construal of some target event, but in fact adds its endowment to the experience independent of any categorization or construal effects on the target event. Thus, endowment does not compete with assimilation but adds another explanatory concept.
Tversky and Griffin offered alternative explanations of two studies from the mood as information paradigm, applying the E-C decomposition to varying time between experiences and varying relatedness across experiences. The two applications are informative as to the nature of the assumptions necessary to isolate these effects in the E-C framework. Take, for example, the study first presented in Strack et al. (1985) where participants were asked to report their current well-being on a 10-point scale after reporting (a) either a positive or negative life event that actually occurred to them, (b) either recently or in the past. The cell means for the four relevant conditions are presented in Fig. 4·3 in the form of a bar graph, ordered so that conditions defined by events in the present come first, and within that, ordered by positive and negative events. This allows us to use the decomposition table presented for the first study (Table 4 .1), with past/present replacing related/unrelated. Like an unrelated event in the past, the positive event in the present provides no contrast, only endowment, so its contribution to satisfaction comes entirely from its positive endowment effect; the same logic holds for those thinking about a negative event in the present; their satisfaction comes only from the negative endowment, and all other effects are zero. This assumption (that the present contributes only endowment) seems reasonable, and provides estimates of the positive endowment (the positive present cell mean -grand mean= 8.9-8 = 0.9), and negative endowment (7.1-8 = -0.9), and provides an estimate of ilie total endowment of 1.8 units. 
Past
The isolation of the contrast effect relies on a which is that the amount of the endowment effect is the same for events and then the same paired-cell subtractions as used in the first two studies are ->n•~,.,,,,.,,.i On one the of salience may be equal because are asked to think about both events in the same way and before making the satisfaction judgment; on the other the thoughts about the current event may carry a riential weight and, due to temporal construal & may be unJuF;u• of in a more concrete fashion. The resolution of this issue we follow and Griffin's distinction between ~v•nn<mc if endowment depends on salience and not on the degree of re-ex1Pe1·1ei1Cf~d then this decomposition is this we find that the contrast associated with the positive event is -1.4 (7.5 -and the contrast associated with the past event is 1.4 (8.5 yielding a total contrast of 2.8, substantially larger than the total endowment. Note that if the assumption of equal endowment (equal of past and events is violated, the contrast effect will be overstated.
Another of the E-C framework to the mood as information examined the effect of putting in a pleasant or room for an hour before measuring their life satisfaction and satisfaction with their involves another assumption, which is that environmental is related to one Probability seems to play a key role in determining the relative balance of endowment and contrast from expectations about the future. Very low probability events still provide some endowment through hope and fear, but no contrast. Long-shot bets, whether in lotteries or on horses, produce pleasurable hope and day-dreams, but are so improbable that they do not lead to great disappointment (future contrast) or reduce current pleasures (simultaneous contrast). Likewise, unlikely but tragic health diagnoses provide anxiety or terror during the experience of expectation but little elation after they are ruled out, because a better outcome was always so likely. Thus, it seems that probability moderates the balance of endowment and contrast from expectations about the future much as relatedness or relevance does for memories from the past.
Schwarz and Strack (1999) present data collected by Schwarz and Hippler that allow us to apply the E-C decomposition to data from the inclusion/exclusion paradigm. In this study, university students were asked to recall a positive or negative event from 2 years before; half of the students were reminded that such events took place before university, when they were still high school students. The salience and perceived magnitude of this role transition should thus signal that the past events were not informative about one's current life satisfaction. The E-C decomposition for this paradigm is presented in Table 4 .2, on the assumption that past irrelevant events (signaled by the high-school/university divide) provide only contrast, whereas past relevant events provide both contrast and endowment.
The grand mean across all cells is 7.6. Thus the negative contrast effect from recalling a positive event (and being reminded of the distance from high school) is substantial ( 6.2 -7.6 = -1.4); the positive contrast effect is moderate ( 8.2-7.6 = o.6), and the total contrast effect is large: 2 units. The positive endowment is isolated by subtracting the positive irrelevant mean (6.2) from the positive relevant mean (8.7), which yields 2.5, and the negative endowment is isolated by subtracting the negative irrelevant mean (8.2) from the negative relevant mean (7-4), yielding o.8. The total endowment is thus 3.3, substantially larger than the contrast effect.
A shared implication of the E-C framework, the inclusion/exclusion model, and the Empathy-Contrast model (Brandstatter, 2000) is that the existence of two countervailing psychological forces in the aggregation of hedonic events over time makes it difficult to find strong relations between objective life circumstances and general life satisfaction. A very positive event may have a net negative or positive contribution to later well-being depending on the way it is represented and processed at the later time. Ross and Simonson (1991) noted that the E-C model and the of loss aversion a for In the case of an event will take away from the pleasure of a later less-good event; because losses than the negative contrast effect will be than the rmnn"r" the order. In the case of a the conof the later good event, consistent with the E-C framework. Ross and Simonson added two novel contributions. First, used a measure for a video game, showing that when a good video game was evaluated after a poor game, were willing to pay an additional $3 on average for the same game compared to when the poor game was evaluated last.
linked the effect to the for segregating rather than Mr. A received $120 from the electric company for overpayments he had made the year. Later that day, he lost a $20 bilL Mr. B received $100 from the electric company for overpayments.
Who was happier? A orB?
As for both mixed and mixed losses, people cuvu"''"' the outcomes (as in case B here) would make when the event came first. This that the negative contrast effect from event first reduces the overall below that created from the one-shot payment On the other hand, people thought that segregating the outcomes in case A would make n:.r'n"''" when the event came last, implying that the contrast effect from the event last enhances the overall that created the This analysis is it the basis for deliberate can use to maximize their welfare from a combination of events.
\..WCVnC<'-<;U jJH'-;nv;;u'-'HUH that wage level is '-"'-IH<UHH.<VH that a term representing an expectations-based contrast or preference drift, so that higher wages require a higher threshold for satisfaction, changes the coefficient for wage on job satisfaction to a more sensible positive and significant value.
The Contrast-Empathy model of social comparison
In motivating the Contrast-Empathy model, Brandstatter pointed out that the effects of social comparison have been interpreted in terms of contrast: feeling good if one performs better than another (especially a relevant other, Jesser, 1988), or feeling worse and motivated to do better if one performs more poorly than another. Festinger's (1954) classic social comparison theory can be seen as a contrast theory (self-other) of comparative satisfaction. Contrast can also be seen as a central mechanism in equity theories of satisfaction, which postulate that people weigh the relative value of inputs and outputs to determine the fairness of outcomes. However, according to Brandstatter, this traditional focus on contrast and the informational role of social comparison neglects the emotional impact of another person's outcomes on the perceiver. If the comparison target is liked or otherwise close to us, we feel good for them if they succeed; if the target person is disliked, we feel good at them if they fail. Brandstatter argues that the pleasure or pain felt upon the good or bad experience of a dose target is due to the emotion of empathy (empathic joy or empathic distress) whereas the pleasure or pain felt upon the bad or good experience of a disliked target is due to the emotion of malicious joy or envy. Brandstatter motivated his model with a little-known comment from Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bulman's (1978) classic study of paraplegics, where they reported that interviewers were often depressed by their feelings of empathy with the victim-rather than cheered up by contrast. Later, Tesser (1988, 1991) proposed that people gain from reflecting the high performance or standing of others when the relationship is close and the comparison dimension is oflow personal relevance, but suffer from dissatisfaction when a distant other or high-relevance dimension invokes a comparison.
The novel aspect of Bransdstatter's Contrast-Empathy model is that a given social comparison can yield both contrast and empathic emotion effects, which can have additive or offsetting effects on one's own satisfaction. The tendency to compare in a competitive sense is heightened for a self-relevant dimension, enhancing the contrast effect. The tendency to feel empathy is heightened for a close positive relationship, enhancing the endowment-like effect (the tendency to feel malicious pleasure is heightened for a distant negative relationship, which introduces a kind of reverse endowment effect). Thus, pure contrast (competitive comparison) will occur for a self-relevant dimension with a target for which one feels neutral. Empathy will dominate for a non-relevant dimension with a target with which one has an extremely dose warm relationship. Other combinations of relevance and closeness will lead to mixtures of contrast and empathy. Looking only at positive and negative relationships, positive (better than) and negative (worse than) comparisons, and low and high relevance dimensions yields eight cells, as shown in Table 4·3· Using a generalization of the linear decomposition from the E-C model (displayed in contrast form in Table 4 .3), we can see that the greatest satisfaction comes from a downward comparison on an irrelevant dimension towards someone whom one feels cold or negative. Greatest dissatisfaction comes from an upwards comparison on a self-relevant dimension towards someone whom one feels cold or negative. 2) where consistent with the dominance of contrast. The in the relalevel of dissatisfacmean is -o.6, which is coneffects cannot be but relative contrast effects between low and relevance can be ~.-v'u~-'u".u of cells. 1he relative contrast effect is for rn~n'"'"'""' :y was to them both.
, indicate satisfaction ide the approximate evel (estimated from ,n -satisfaction). ls from school years), 1trast. Looking at the ;tion and all upward ~ontrast. The highest , in the negative relat level of dissatisfac-,egative relationship, s -o.6, which is con-)t be isolated, but the ed for every matched gh and low relevance and smallest for the hat the power of the mal relationship.
An interesting application of the Contrast-Empathy model is to intergroup or international comparisons of well-being. It is often assumed that a relatively wealthy individual in a poor country would feel highly satisfied because of the dominance of local comparisons. However, the Contrast-Empathy model implies that individuals who identify with their own region might experience off-setting feelings of empathy and contrast relative to the worse-off majority around them. Helliwell, Barrington-Leigh, Harris, and Huang (2010) examined direct and contextual effects of income and social resources on life satisfaction across so nations. They found that having good friends had substantial positive effects both at an individual level and a contextual level. The individual-level coefficient represents the comparison of individuals within a country who have friends versus those who do not-a standard social support finding. The contextual effect is more intriguing, as it represents the comparison of individuals who come from countries where people, on average, are more or less likely to have friends. This, then, is a societal empathetic endowment effect a la Brandstatter.
The affective Endowment -Contrast model
Brandstatter's model of social comparison was developed by integrating several approaches in the social comparison literature. Despite this, the resulting model is a close analogue to the E-C model with additional emotional processing. Cheng (2004) directly applied the E-C framework to emotion and mood, using emotional experience rather than symbolic consumption as the building blocks of satisfaction. Cheng's approach builds upon Bradburn's (1969) affect balance model, which posits that overall well-being is a function of the difference between positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA). However, Cheng notes that this linear discrepancy model ignores context or interaction effects that may arise through adaptation: positive affect may have a greater impact when negative affect is predominant. "When life is smooth, the effect of adding more positive experiences may be marginal:' Thus, the affective approach predicts that overall life satisfaction can be modeled by a linear additive term and an interactive term, so tllat affective well-being = (PA -NA) + (PA x NA). According to Cheng's definition, the main effects of PA and NA are equivalent to endowment effects, and the interaction is equivalent to contrast effects. Following Tversky and Griffin's original approach, the affect model examines the effect of the past on the present; unlike the original model, it looks at the aggregated balance of positive and negative emotions, not on the effect of a specific past experience. Thus, the focus is no longer on the direct and indirect effects of a given event on well-being, but on how a given emotional experience will have a different effect on well-being depending on the makeup of the rest of the set of experiences. To test this model, Cheng collected diary data twice daily for 4 weeks using a set of adjectives representing current positive and negative affect. The average levels ofPA and NA (and their interaction) were then related to the reported general life satisfaction a week after the conclusion of the 4 weeks. Significant regression coefficients were found for PA, NA, and their interaction, although the effect size for PA dwarfed the other terms. A plot of the relevant interaction (slopes for PA on satisfaction broken down by high NA, + 1 SD, and low NA, -1 SD) showed that the effect of PA was stronger for those high in NA. This is consistent with the view that PA has a greater impact against a background of regular NA (or conversely that PA has a reduced because of a than (2009) exam-:ategically to enhance n negative or positive 'ely to well-being) verrrg positively or negal both the tendency to past, I often smile or m in a way that makes ch memories to boost esent ("When I recall \fhen I recall unhappy ").Recall that endowent, easy to recall, and :as a standard of comnakes me feel content :ontrast with the pres-,lso implicated a belief lich things have gotten ~ of dispositional affec-'e regardless of what is s find consistent modal happiness and self-, and negative contrast egy was found only in 'pensity items referred >pyevent. 1t happy and unhappy een an account where Jries drives happiness.
1 highlights the differognitive effect and the rration, and emotional
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The complexities of interpreting natural experiences in the E-C framework explains why so few naturalistic studies have followed this model. The general statement of the theorybeginning with the narrow account of the dual functions of past hedonic experiences on current life satisfaction and broadening to an account that included "memories and expectations; successes and failures of the past, hopes and fears of the future'' -is a conceptual framework for thinking about the role of endowment and contrast in measurements of wellbeing. The extensions of the model to social comparisons and emotional experiences serve to further broaden the toolbox of applications.
UTILITY VERSUS WELL-BEING, CHOICE VERSUS JUDGMENT
Psychologists and sociologists talk of well-being, happiness, and satisfaction whereas economists traditionally restrict their vocabulary of motivation to the concept of utility. However, even utility can be used in two different senses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984) : experience utility, the pleasure or pain from the actual experience of an event or outcome, and decision utility, the anticipated gain in pleasure at the time of choosing (or predicted utility; Kahneman & Varey, 1992) . Experience utility, like well-being, is generally assessed by judgmental methods such as ratings, pricing, or satisfaction thermometers. Decision value is generally inferred from choices, typically binary in nature. Most naturally, judgments take place after the event is experienced; choices take place in advance and require an assessment of predicted utility.
However, even when choice and judgment are both made prospectively and broadly measure decision utility, they differ in how they are affected by contrast and endowment. Given the prominence of choice in economic measurement, we first explore the choicejudgment discrepancy and review relevant research before following up the more general issue of how well-being measures differ in their sensitivity to endowment and contrast.
There are two key methodological differences between choice and judgment, both of which have implications for the role of contrast and endowment. First, choice requires a binary outcome whereas judgment requires a continuous measurement scale. The forcedchoice methodology favors the option that is highest on the most important dimension (the "prominence effect"; Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988) because it leads to a search for a single dominating reason to choose. A continuous scale of judgment leads to a broader focus on combining multiple inputs to form the final judgment (Slovic et al., 1990) . In general, endowment (the actual amount of money or pleasure or pain) is a more prominent or justifiable reason to choose than contrast, and hence dominates choice, whereas judgment is based on a combination of both contrast and endowment.
Second, choice is fundamentally comparative whereas judgment is largely absolute. The focus in choice is what is different between options. This leads salient qualitative differences across conditions to loom larger in choice than in judgment. Consider two job scenarios that are comparable in every way but differ by $50 in annual salary. If all else is equal, everyone will choose the job with the higher salary, a huge effect size. Yet the difference in judged attractiveness of each job taken alone will surely be vanishingly small.
Consider the related versus unrelated stock market games described earlier to make this point: Clearly, everyone would choose the negative contrast condition (where total earnings were $10 based on an initial reward of $6 and a final reward of $4) rather than the positive contrast condition (where total earnings were $6 based on an initial reward of $2 and a final reward of $4) if they compared the two outcomes. In this case, the chooser thinks not about happiness or satisfaction, or the processes that would lead to either, but simply about the dominating argument that $10 is better than $6. Yet, the satisfaction judgments were indistinguishable across conditions because they reflected the joint (countervailing) effects of contrast and endowment.
Tversky and Griffin tested this intuition in a job choice scenario experiment that equated endowment with total annual salary and contrast with the standard of comparison salary. The results have been widely cited by economists, although, as we later describe, its implied methodological critique of using choice as the sole or privileged measure of utility has not affected economic practice. Student participants were asked to imagine they had a job offer as a junior editor at two magazines: one position paid $35,000 as an annual salary, but most other similar workers received $38,ooo per year; the second position paid $33,000, with most similar workers receiving $3o,ooo. Participants were asked either to choose the job they would take, or to indicate which job would make them happier. The reversal in observed "preference" between conditions was dramatic: 84% of participants chose the job with the higher salary (endowment) and higher comparison level (negative contrast), but 62% expected to be more satisfied with the job that was defined by a lower comparison level (positive contrast) and lower salary (endowment).
To examine whether these results generalized to actual experiences, Tversky and Griffin (1991) assessed satisfaction versus choice with rewards from a pair of two-part competitive games. The design placed particularly strong pressures on participants to be consistent across measures as it assessed satisfaction and choice within subjects, with the choice coming after the measure of satisfaction with the two outcomes. Any participant who showed a "reversal" from satisfaction to choice was thus fully aware of his or her own inconsistency. Contrast was created by providing feedback on both practice and reward trials-improvement created a positive contrast and declining performance created a negative contrast. Each participant improved in one game, but received a higher reward for the other game ($3 versus $1). After each game, participants rated their satisfaction with their performance; after completing both tasks and both satisfaction ratings, participants were asked to choose which task they would choose to do. For those participants who gave non-identical ratings of satisfaction across the two tasks, a little more than half (54%) expressed greater satisfaction with the positive contrast, low-payoff task. However, 75% of those also chose the negative contrast, high-payoff task, again consistent with the notion that the payoff, representing endowment, loomed larger in choice than in judgment, presumably because it provided a more compelling reason to choose.
It is noteworthy that econometric analyses of the relation between well -being and whether one's neighbors are richer or poorer than oneself support the notion that relative income can drive happiness (Luttmer, 2005) : controlling for one's own salary, having higher earning neighbors is associated with lower levels of happiness, consistent with a contrast effect, and having a higher standard of comparison income within a job category is associated with lower levels of job satisfaction (Clark & Oswald, 1996) .
The implications of the choice-judgment discrepancy for the economic study of wellbeing can be seen by its application to Pareto optimality. defines an acceptable (or Pareto optimal) allocation of resources as one that improves everyone's lot: the change entails no losers, only winners. As a choice criterion, this has considerable force; one should prefer a world where one's lot is improved, even if other people's lots are improved more. However, judged (and experienced) satisfaction may go down, not up, under Pareto optimality. Consider an organization that provides 100% salary increases to a few executives, and 5% salary increases to everyone else. Surely, everyone in the organization would choose this state of affairs over the previous state. All the same, the negative effects of the contrast and comparison would make most of the individuals less satisfied with their lot. Another dramatic example of the choice-judgment discrepancy comes from a study of Olympic athletes (Medvec, Madey, & Gilovich, 1995) : silver medalists feel worse than lowerperforming athletes, presumably because of the pain of comparison. Yet, it is absurd to believe that an athlete would choose to come in fourth or sixth and give up the endowment value of a second-place finish in order to avoid the painful contrast effect. This colorful example also highlights the subtle variety of comparison processes that can create contrast: the silver medalists did not use the gold medalists as the standard, but instead were haunted by the ease of imagining themselves on the gold podium.
2 This example invites the question of what choice measures measure, and what is utility, if people systematically make choices that do not maximize their experienced pleasure.
In a series of survey studies, Solnick and Hemenway (1998, 2005 ; see also Alpizar, Carlsson, & Johansson-Stenman, 2005; Carlsson, Johansson-Stenman, & Martinsson, 2007) examined the role of comparison/interpersonal contrast (which they term "positional concerns") across a range of goods, including salary, attractiveness, and vacation time. For example participants were asked to choose between a world in which they earn $5o,ooo and others earn $25,000, and a world in which they earn $IOo,ooo and others earn $2oo,ooo; and between a world in which they have 2 weeks of vacation time and others have 1 week, and a world in which they have 4 weeks of vacation time and others have 8 weeks. Respondents preferred being relatively more attractive than others, were indifferent about relative versus absolute education and relative versus absolute salary, and strongly preferred a longer absolute vacation than a comparatively longer (but absolutely shorter) vacation. The authors argue that positional concerns (i.e., contrast and comparison) need to be incorporated into public policy. "Benefits to the rich will hurt the poor if the poor, like everyone else, care about their relative standing. The majority of respondents to our survey rejected the prospect of everyone becoming richer if it was accompanied by a fall in their own relative standing" (Solnick and Hemenway, 1998) .
A more general explanatory account that characterizes domains where choice may deviate from judgment, and contrast will be more important is the evaluability model (Hsee, 1996; Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount, & Bazerman, 1999) . According to this framework, choice is a paradigmatic example of a "joint" or comparative evaluation mode whereas judgment is a paradigmatic example of a "single" or non-comparative evaluation mode. The tendency for joint evaluations such as choice to deviate from single evaluations such as satisfaction judgment is accentuated when the stimulus dimensions are low in "evaluability': that is, when it is difficult to determine what is a high and low level of the stimulus without a guiding comparison or norm. For example, temperature is inherently evaluable-it is clear that life in a of 4oC will be dominated by cold, while life in a will be dominated by hot. It is possible to make on one's quality oflife considering the in a single city. On the other hand, money is not evaluable and hence is difficult to weigh without a norm or comparative option.
This joint-separate evaluation framework was motivated by an example of Bazerman, Loew•enstellrl, and White (1992) , where respondents were asked to choose evaluation: comparative) or rate (single evaluation: absolute) which settlement was more acceptable: $6oo to the self and $8oo to a or $5oo to the self and $500 to the neiP-I-1ho,r_
Given that money is not intrinsically evaluable, participants who rated the acceptability of one at a time focused mostly on the relative information negative contrast); thus the payoff was rated as more acceptable by 71% of respondents. However, when ~~•ct;r.;~" were asked to indicate a mode) which option was more acceptable, 75% selected the unequal, higher payoff (better endowment, less contrast). Money-not intrinsievaluable when evaluated large when made the differences in one's own payoffs prominent. Another example brings the evaluability into the domain Hsee (1993) presented participants with two hypothetical salary options, a absolute amount with a decreasing trend over 4 years, and one with a lower absolute amount but an trend over time. In evaluation mode (choice), ~~,e;-;r.;~~ nrc•tPrre>cl the higher overall 0 "''~'"""" evaluation mode salary tre>;oc-t"'"' with the endowment-contrast account of the ch<Jl0e-rua:2;ment
The evaluability and E--C approaches to the '-' ""u·-'-''""'H'-''" these but they are based on related but distinct t:MJldJmwui c.M<HliJK, the job choice reversal from choice and satisfaction measures that are both in a evaluation and so cannot be explained by
The evaluability framework adds to the E-C framework two guiding
The first is that evaluation (choice) will tend to the impact of non-evaluable dimensions relative to single evaluation l!uc--auu tend to the resources such as uueu1gt:1Hx and attractiveness, which non-evaluable without a standard of will be chosen for resources such as of vacation or hours of sleep, which are evaluable even without a will be chosen for absolute and rior, and that the associated focus on the dimension when that dimension referred to a more cultured outlook. On the assessment of well-being: the role of endowment and contrast One of the major areas of progress in the studyofwell-being over the 20 years since the publication of the E-C framework has been the clarification of the status of different measures of well-being. The vast number of well-being measures can be roughly classified into four clusters: affective measures, happiness measures, life satisfaction measures, and comparative life satisfaction measures. The measurement clusters move from the most affective and tied to immediate experience (based on immediate feelings and described as measuring hedonic well-being (Stone, Schwartz, Broderick, & Deaton, 2010) or objective happiness (Kahneman, 1999) ) to the most cognitive and summative (based on systematic thought and reflection, described as global well-being).
What lessons does the E-C framework have for understanding the role of different measures? The key question, as always, is the contribution to expressed well-being from the direct immediate experience, the direct contextual endowment, and the indirect contextual contrast. At first thought, one might imagine that the more affectively immediate measures would be more responsive to endowment whereas the more reflective measures would be relatively more responsive to contrast and comparison. However, the evidence is mixed. Consider immediate experience sampling measures, a family of measures ranging from asking respondents about their contemporaneous experience of positive and negative emotions to asking respondents to keep diaries of emotions experienced during specific events, either at specific times of the day or at randomly indicated times. Kahneman, Krueger, and colleagues (e.g., Kahneman & Krueger, 2006) have suggested a U-index to summarize such measures (an index assessing the relative time spent in unpleasant emotions).
In a cross-country analysis, Kahneman and Krueger (2oo6) found that French women report spending more time in a pleasurable state than American women, but nonetheless report lower life satisfaction-in other words, a contradiction between measures of "objective" and "subjective" well-being. The authors interpret this as a possible extremity bias for Americans, and conclude that caution is warranted for cross-national comparisons of global satisfaction. In addition, it seems possible that the cultural reversal arises due to different standards of comparison, which weigh more heavily in satisfaction than in immediate pleasure. Momentary experiences show only a small of life circumstances, whereas satisfaction reflects income and material wealth, as described as follows.
Kahneman, and colleagues have contrasted the relation between income and immediate affective responses and that of income and global measures of satisfaction (Diener, Kahneman, Tov, & Arora, 2010) . The measure of satisfaction that is least directly influenced by affect is the Cantril ladder (Cantril, 1965) , which asks respondents to report The Cantril ladder is a framework because it contradicts the usual rule that more rnnr>iti,,D measures are more reflective of contrast.
for a anchors (the worst versus best to mind the extremes that the world has to the ladder minimizes the effect of contrast, at least in the to the extent that individuals face different contexts-whether um,•~··~·, should have minimal effects on the as long as 
